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Why the Labour Party Lost the British 2019 General Election: Social Democracy
versus Neoliberalism and the Far Right
Abstract
After Jeremy Corbyn was elected leader of the British Labour Party in 2015, the party for the first time
took a stance against austerity. The new leadership proposed to raise investment and productivity;
nationalise some utilities; end privatisations; improve trade union rights, wages and conditions; a Green
New Deal creating a million jobs; a rise in taxation of capital and the rich, to fund a 10% rise in spending
on public services and benefits; consequent expansion and improvements of services, better wages and
conditions, some services made free; large scale council house building, and re-regulation of private
renting. This programme goes no further than governments in the postwar boom; but after forty years of
neoliberalism it is a radical turn to the left. The party, however, came up against an offensive by the far
right to engineer Britain’s exit from the EU and thus deepen neoliberalism, using xenophobia to gain
popular support; the Conservative win in the 2019 election marked a victory for this project and a severe
defeat for Labour and the working class. This article seeks to explain this outcome by considering the
dialectics of long-standing structures of British political economy, the inheritance of neoliberalism, and
the strategies and tactics of the Conservative and Labour Parties. It examines the aims of the far right in
Britain in relation to capital, and the campaigns of Labour on its economic and Brexit policies. The article
focuses particularly on popular consciousness: the rise of individualism and xenophobia arising from
daily life under neoliberalism; poor understanding of the economics of austerity and Brexit; variation of
these by age and geography; and consequent votes in the referendum and two general elections. It
concludes with some reflections on strategies for social democratic parties in the present period.
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Introduction
Following the defeat of the Labour Party in the British general election of May 2015, Jeremy
Corbyn was elected leader, replacing Ed Miliband. In the next four years the Corbyn leadership
developed a social democratic programme. Formally speaking, this programme did not go beyond
the consensus politics of the postwar boom: its proposals for taxation, spending on public services
and benefits, trade union rights, labour market measures, industrial policy and public ownership of
utilities would not have surprised Harold Wilson or even Harold Macmillan; only the Green New
Deal would have seemed novel.1 But Corbyn’s programme was a decisive break from the
neoliberalism of capital and governments since the 1970s. This sharp turn to the left was, and still
is, unique among social democratic parties worldwide since the start of the neoliberalism. This
singularity was partly a product of the unusually democratic system for electing the party leader
introduced by Miliband; but it also reflected widespread popular disillusionment with forty years of
neoliberalism, and profound dissatisfaction of party members with the neoliberal-lite strategy of
Blair, Brown and Miliband. Corbyn’s election gave hope that a government could be elected that
would improve conditions of work, restore public services, and begin to challenge some of the
accepted prerogatives of capital. For some Marxists, including the present author, the hope was that
such a government would encourage and enable an eruption of popular demands and selforganisation within both production and reproduction spheres, pushing the government further to
the left and creating a dynamic of working class empowerment. A Labour government could thus
produce immediate material gains for the working class, and potentially open up an offensive class
dynamic. The popularity and potential of Corbyn’s programme was shown by the party’s
membership tripling to 600,000, making it by far the largest party in Europe, and by the vote it
obtained in the general election in 2017, when it deprived the Conservatives of their majority.
These hopes were, however, dashed by the December 2019 general election which the Conservative
Party won by a large majority. This was a disaster not only for the working class and the left in
Britain but also for the left in other countries, who are now told: Britain shows that a social
democratic programme cannot win. This article aims to understand this debacle. My aim is not to
‘celebrate’ Corbynism but to analyse the barriers to social democratic parties seeking to form
governments after forty years of neoliberalism and in the face of the global rise of the far right. The
barriers are, of course, to some extent specific to each country; in this piece I put considerable
emphasis on the pecularities of British political economy. But I will argue that there are some
problems of social democratic strategy which are likely to be found in all high-income countries in
the present period, and these go beyond traditional Marxist critiques of social democracy.
Before it had hardly started, Labour’s campaign against austerity was thrown in the air by
Cameron’s launching of a referendum on membership of the EU. The Labour Party argued for
remain. After a perfunctory campaign devoid of information and analysis and dominated by the farright Leave campaign, leave won the June 2016 vote by 52 to 48%. Labour accepted the result, and,
until September 2019, campaigned for a soft Brexit with Britain remaining in the Customs Union
and maintaining a ‘close relationship’ with the Single Market. Cameron was replaced by May as
prime minister, who took and maintained a hard Brexit stance with no concessions to Labour or
Tory soft Brexiters, let alone to Remain voters. Despite this stance, the right of the Tory Party, led
by Boris Johnson, continued to push for leaving the EU with no deal and undermined May’s
negotiations. To strengthen her hand and exploit Labour’s low poll ratings May called a general
election in 2017. This, however, was disastrous for her: on the basis of its anti-austerity stance,
Labour massively increased its share of the vote relative to 2015, the biggest increase in an
opposition’s vote since 1945. May lost her majority, and had to rely on the ten Ulster Democratic
Unionist MPs. In 2019, when May’s withdrawal agreement was voted down for the third time by a
combination of the Tory right and the opposition, May resigned and was replaced by Johnson.
Johnson purged the Tory soft Brexiters, and, aiming to give himself a working majority, called a

general election ‘to get Brexit done’. The anti-austerity sentiment which had nearly won Labour the
2017 election was not enough to counter Johnson’s promise to ‘end’ three and a half years of Brexit
wrangling, and the Tories obtained a large majority. To assess the Corbyn project, then, we need to
examine it over the whole period 2015-9, and in relation to the so-far successful project of the Tory
Right.
Some commentators on the far left have criticised Corbyn’s programme as a strategy for socialism.
I do not include such a critique here. The project of Corbyn and the majority of left Labour Party
members was a limited and short-term one: to elect a government which would aim to ameliorate
the conditions of labour, public services and benefits, industrial organisation and ecology. This
would have been an advance for the class struggle, and its defeat (for the time being) therefore
deserves analysis. It is implausible that this defeat was due to Corbyn not having a strategy for
socialism. I therefore want to investigate the barriers to convincing a majority of the population to
back the given manifesto, in preference to the Conservatives’ programme of hard Brexit, continued
austerity and (rhetorical) xenophobia. My focus, then, is on popular consciousness of the macro
economy, public services and ecology on the one hand, and of immigration and ‘immigrants’ on the
other.
My approach is Marxist. Society is a totality, within which the spheres of ‘politics’, ‘economics’,
‘social life’ and ‘culture’ are moments rather than discrete structures, and hence are internally
related. Capitalist society has deep structures and durable processes, but these are replete with
contradictions, and so with class struggle (Gough and Das, 2018). I understand ‘the working class’
in the Marxist sense, that is, those who over their life span rely for their material survival on wage
labour – roughly 90% of the British population.
This article is mainly about England and Wales. This because Labour had few seats in Scotland
before the 2019 election and does not stand in Northern Ireland. It is also because I do not have
space for a discussion of the specific politics of Scotland and Northern Ireland over the period.
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the 2019 vote, distinguishing between the
votes of different social groups and their apparent motivation. Section 3 considers explanation of
the vote. I criticise and reject two explanations of Labour’s defeat given by the centre and right of
the party. I summarise some well-known political-organisational moments: the different resources
and capacities of the parties, the conventional and social media. I justify my main focus in this
piece: popular consciousness and knowledge of and ideas about the economy. Section 4 recounts
the impact on jobs and living standards of the Conservative (dominated) governments since 2010;
this experience was Labour’s strongest card in the 2017 and 2019 elections. Section 5 sets out the
progress of neoliberalism in Britain since the 1970s, and its impacts on popular consciousness of
economic and social issues and on modes of political discourse. I use a theory of ideology derived
from Marx, supplemented by a pragmatic theory of ‘interests’ in its double sense. Section 6
examines how the Blair-Brown government and Miliband lost support for Labour, particularly in
poor regions and among older people; this posed a major problem to the party under Corbyn.
Section 7 examines the class origins and ascent of the Tory Right. I argue that its programme is an
intensification of neoliberalism, which uses nationalism and xenophobia to gain working class
support for its project. I examine its reasons for getting Britain to leave the EU, and the
contradictions for capital that this involves. Section 8 examines the votes in the 2016 referendum,
focusing on reasons for the vote to Leave; preserved and intensified over three years, these proved
to be crucial in the 2019 general election.
I then turn to the Labour Party. Section 9 considers the difficulties of convincing people of
Labour’s economic and ecological programme after forty years of neoliberalism. Section 10
considers the difficulties of convincing people of the economic logic of Remain or a soft Brexit. All

these involved conveying ideas about the macro economy (national, international), coming up
against the restricted nature of working class people’s economic knowledge due to their position in
capitalist society. Section 11 examines how judgements of the supposed qualities of the party
leaders became central to the election, and how Corbyn became unacceptable to many voters.
Section 12 analyses Labour’s fateful decision in October 2019 to support an election. Section 13
summarises the analysis, and considers some lessons for social democratic parties seeking election
in the present period.

The 2019 general election vote
The Tories won the election with 43.6% of the UK vote to Labour’s 32.2%, giving a Tory majority
of 80 seats. There was a swing of 4.6% from Labour to Tories compared with the 2017 general
election. The Tories took 57 seats off Labour, all of which were Leave seats in the Midlands, North
and Wales. These were nearly all deindustrialised, poor areas, and included many of the former
coalfields which had been crushed by Thatcher in 1985; that these areas could, usually for the first
time, elect a Tory MP was a particular shock for the left. Labour’s share of the vote in each social
class (A – E) was roughly equal, as was the Conservatives’; the class basis of the parties’ support
had therefore changed markedly over the previous two decades, with Labour increasing its higher
income votes and the Conservatives their lower income votes.
The result was not, however, as decisive a defeat for Labour as this summary might imply.
Labour’s share of the vote was higher than in 2015 (under Miliband), 2010 (under Brown) and 2006
(under Blair). It was higher than in 2003 when Blair won by 144 seats. But the spatial distribution
of Labour votes (concentrated in the cities) and Tory votes (diffuse), combined with the first-pastthe-post system, gave the Tories a disproportionate number of seats. The social democratic vote,
including the SNP, PC, Greens and SDLP, totalled 39.7%. The Conservatives’ vote increased only a
little from the 2017 election, while Labour’s fell by 2.6 million; many former Labour voters did not
vote. There was an enormous age divide in voting: Labour was supported by the majority of people
under 45 and the Conservatives by the majority over 45; people aged 18-24 voted 60% for Labour
and 18% Tory, whereas for people aged 65 and over the proportions were the reverse (YouGov).
This bifurcated vote means that the analysis needs to both explain the support for Labour among
younger voters and the lack of support among the older.
In the crucial Leave constituencies in England and Wales, people said that they voted for parties
other than Labour, or abstained, for three main reasons (YouGov):(i) support for Brexit, and a wish to ‘get it done’;
(ii) contempt for, or hatred of, Jeremy Corbyn;
(iii) being unconvinced of the feasibility of Labour’s economic programme (Helm, 2019).
Implicitly, the benefits of Labour’s economic programme were not perceived as sufficiently strong
to outweigh these negatives. A very common view encountered by canvassers was indifference to
the election: a belief that the government, or the state, or politicians can do nothing, or that
‘politicians are all the same’ (Chakrabortty, 2019a). This article is focused on unpacking these
views and explaining their origin.

Explaining the election result
The result can be seen as the triumph in Britain of the international far right project. From the postYugoslavia governments, to Modi, Putin, Erdogan, Kaczyński, Orban, Trump and Bolsonaro, this
project seeks to deepen neoliberalism’s subordination of workers and, in the face of a growing
environmental movement, allow extractive capital and polluting industries free rein. It supresses
opposition by attacks on the media, judiciary and parliaments, and fixes elections. It mobilises
working class support through xenophobia, racism or ethnic/religious antagonism (Saad Filho, 2018;
Worth, 2019). The project of Johnson, Gove and Farage fits this template in all respects, and 2019
election was the victory of this international movement in Britain. While this is an accurate
description, to see it as explanation implies a structuralist theorisation in which particular periods of
capitalist history are cast in a mode of regulation dictated by capitalist imperatives, as in Regulation
Theory. This approach neglects the contradictory nature of all modes of capitalist regulation,
ignores the role of class struggle, and thus has nothing to say about the agency of the working class
(Clarke, 1992; Gough, 1996). It therefore provides no guide to how the far right achieved its
ascendancy, and how the left could have acted differently.
The right and centre of the Labour Party and associated commentators have used two arguments to
explain the result: incompetence of the Corbyn leadership, and the manifesto being too left wing.
Neither of these holds up to scrutiny. It is absurd to attribute to a few individuals complete
responsibility for a major national event, in the style of conservative historiography. The
leadership’s actions were highly constrained by internal divisions within the party, a forty-year
neoliberalisation of the economy, social life, popular consciousness and politics, and a Brexit
offensive by the Tory Right which was backed by important sections of capital and most of the
press. What we need to unravel is the dialectic of this hostile external context and the decisions of
the party. As to the manifesto being too left wing, some people did not vote Labour because they
thought the programme unfeasible. But the majority vote for Labour of people under 45 was
motivated overwhelmingly by the manifesto.
The election result was partly a result of factors in the realm of politics narrowly conceived:(a) The continuity of the Labour Party with the New Labour period. The Corbyn leadership was
sabotaged repeatedly by senior managers in party HQ (Novaramedia, 2020). The majority of the
party’s MPs were opposed to Corbyn, triggered an unsuccessful attempt to replace him as leader in
2016, and continually criticised him in the media.
(b) The characterisation of Corbyn as anti-semitic by the Labour right, without evidence. The
inability of Labour to bring to popular attention the racist policies, actions and propaganda of
Conservatives governments 2010-9, and Johnson’s racism.
(c) Far-right terrorist threats to the left, and the murder of Jo Cox.
(d) The massive imbalance between the parties in the media, the social media, and funding. The
Tories’ threats to the BBC and C4. The refusal of Johnson to take part in TV debates.
(e) The Tories’ stringing out of the negotiations with the EU, creating impatience to ‘get Brexit
done’.
(f) Illegal actions by the Leave campaign, and unconstitutional parliamentary actions by the
government.

(g) Nigel Farage’s vehicles, first UKIP then the Brexit Party, played a large part in developing
xenophobia, particularly in the white working class. In the 2019 election, Farage stood aside in
Labour held seats, allowing the Conservatives to get the votes of his base.
In this article, however, I focus on the role in the election of popular ideas, cultures and ideologies.
I examine knowledge of and ideas about the economy (Britain’s economic relationship to the EU;
Labour’s economic programme); immigration; British and EU policies and structures; and the views
and strategies that people consequently adopt. Popular understanding of a social democratic
programme, and combating xenophobia, are major problems for left parties and movements in all
countries. Accordingly, these are the central concerns of this article.
The Conservatives’ economic and social record, and its competence
The election result was extraordinary given the record of the Tories in government since 2010.
During those ten years, Britain had the weakest recovery from the 2008 amongst the OECD
countries. Capital’s rate of investment was low, with corporations focused on increasing their share
price by high dividend payments and share buy-backs; many corporations went bust having paid out
unjustifiable dividends up to the last moment. In consequence, productivity growth – the key
determinant of long term average income – has been abysmally low: over ten years it has been the
lowest since the industrial revolution. Average wages in 2019 were still below 2010 levels.
From 2010 government spending was cut sharply year by year. Central funding of local
government was cut by 50% over ten years, with larger cuts to Labour controlled authorities and
smaller to Tory controlled. Every public service suffered deterioration of service, and some services
(NHS mental health services, particularly for children, youth services, old people’s centres, Sure
Start, libraries, legal aid) were severely cut or terminated. The Private Finance Initiative was
increasingly used for new facilities, and more and more parts of services contracted to private firms,
including fictitious ‘not for profits’ such as academy school chains; social care became wholly
privatised. Private providers nearly all have worse wages and conditions than public sector, and
deliver inferior services, sometimes farcically bad. Public sector real wages deteriorated, and work
intensity increased to unbearable levels. Regulatory departments of national and local government,
and the HMRC, had their staffing drastically reduced, so that the private sector was increasingly not
policed. State benefits were drastically cut, most of all to people with disabilities, resulting in
sharply rising destitution, hunger, evictions, and deaths. Rises in life expectancy have ended and,
for poorer women, it has decreased.
Housing price and quality worsened massively. Social housing continued to be sold to tenants and
new build was minimal. The stranglehold of the four building majors on the construction of
housing for owner occupation continued, resulting in increasing prices and atrocious quality of
construction. Private sector renting grew rapidly, on the basis of six month contracts, rapidly
increasing rents and bad maintenance. Local authorities’ ability to refuse developers’ proposals
effectively disappeared, resulting in development of housing and commercial uses in locations
accessible only by car.
As to the credibility of the Tory Party entering the 2019 election, there had been numerous cases of
illegality by ministers, and projects involving spectacular waste of public money and egregious
administrative incompetence. There had been five years of open warfare in the governing party
over a major issue, without precedent in the last hundred years. Boris Johnson is, by any normal
standards, an atrocious politician. His record of action in his eight years as mayor of London was
farcically bad – no substantial action on the massive problems of housing and transport in London,
capitulation to property developers, and a series of useless vanity projects costing tens of millions.

He is a serial liar on major issues, not least when he led the Leave campaign in the referendum, and
subsequently in his advocacy of hard or no-deal Brexit. His public statements include crude
misogyny, racism and homophobia.
Unlike Thatcher’s election in 1979, people knew what they were voting for. Thatcher presented a
radically new approach to the economy, neoliberalism, which she promised would revive it and thus
overcome the stagnation and economic crisis which had resulted from the previous dominant model,
Keynesianism. People voting for her were only able to guess the outcomes, but were prepared to
give it a go. The 2019 election was different: the Conservatives promised to continue an austerity
(plus a few flimsy promised improvements) which people had experienced for decades.
A party with this egregious record of economic and social failure, attacks on human rights and rule
of law, and a five year internal split, led by an incompetent liar, should have been a sitting target for
the Labour Party; yet it triumphed. Using Enlightenment assumptions, the left has tended to assume
that people have a clear view of their own economic interests, that they can clearly read the actions
of governments and the implications of party programmes, and judge them against their ‘objective’
interests. But Marxism shows that these assumptions are unfounded. In the Gundrisse and Capital
Marx demonstrates that value relations reify relations between people as relations between things:
the dependence of all on others’ labour appears as the exchange of commodity-things (‘commodity
fetishism’); the power of capital is disguised as the impersonal impulsion to extract and accumulate
surplus value; the wage relation appears as an exchange between equals rather than a process of
exploitation; and thus the value (in the broad sense) of labour appears as the value created in
production, and the value of workers as their wage (Elson, 1979). This is not to say that exchange
and value are unreal; on the contrary, they are the determinate form of social interactions which
impose themselves on all actors; but they mystify the underlying relations of exploitation; they are
both real and false (Geras, 1972). In the next section I apply this approach to understanding popular
consciousness under neoliberalism.

How neoliberalism has shaped popular consciousness: individualisation, competition,
depoliticisation
Capitalism is always a system of disempowerment and alienation of the working class
(Ollman, 1976; Sennett and Cobb, 1993); this has been deepened by neoliberalism. Neoliberalism
emerged in the 1970s as a strategy of capital to restore the rate of profit by imposing the rule of
value more sharply onto economy, social life and the state. Non-market forms of social
coordination - of workers (trade unions, communities, social movements), of capitals (sectoral
organisations, coordinations, long term dependencies), and the mediations of these by the state
(public services, state regulations, state coordinations of production and social life) – were to be
broken up. Workers were to be fragmented and individualised, made to be more reliant on their
own resources, principally the sale of their labour power and their unpaid domestic and caring work.
The competition between workers, a basic feature of capitalist social relations (though poorly
recognised on the left), was sharpened by neoliberalism (Gough, 2010). The rule of value was to be
imposed on all actors and social relations. Depoliticisation was thus not merely a side effect of
neoliberal ‘economics’, nor merely an ideology propagated by the ruling class (though it was those
things too), but was an essential moment of neoliberalism and a key aim of it. Margaret Thatcher’s
dictum ‘the means is economic, the aim is the soul’ points to this centrality of individualisation and
depoliticisation (albeit with the mystifying counterposition to ‘economics’).
This rule of value, materially and ideologically, was not achieved over night. Neoliberalisation has
unfolded in Britain since the 1970s as a dialectical unity of material changes (in production, in
social life), changes in social relations of production and reproduction, and changes in popular ideas.

One moment of this dialectic is that changes in popular ideas lay the basis for capital to further
extend neoliberalisation.
In the realm of production, neoliberalism tendentially raises the rate of profit by devalorising capital
through bankruptcies and scrapping; by freeing capital to move from less to more profitable lines of
investment; and by increasing the rate of exploitation, the share of value-added appropriated by
capital. The latter is achieved by holding down wages and intensifying work. In the private sector,
workers and work intensity are directly subject to the discipline of the (apparent) profitability of
their employer: if the workplace makes an insufficient rate of profit it will close. This discipline has
been reinforced by high unemployment resulting from devalorisation of capital, net immigration,
and the weakening of trade unions. In Britain these processes unfurled in the 1970s and 1980s,
particularly after the recession of 1979-81 which Thatcher exacerbated in order to deepen value
discipline. A large part of capacity in manufacturing and mining was closed, causing a dramatic
increase in unemployment, and the disappearance of many large well-unionised workplaces. These
closures ended many of the work-residence links where workers in a single large workplace or
industry lived together in adjacent neighbourhoods, with a strong sense of shared life and solidarity.
Employers went on the offensive to weaken or destroy unions, whether in the private sector (the
building industry by moving to wholesale labour subcontracting; News International by its move to
Wapping), mixed private and public sector (defeat of the steel strike in 1980-1; direct repression of
unions in the car industry), or in state-owned industry (the defeat of the miners in 1984-5). These
defeats progressively demoralised unionists and undermined workplace resistance. Across the
private and public sectors, management bullying and authoritarianism has intensified. From the
1990s, employment growth has been in consumer services with low rates of unionisation and
insecure contracts. There has consequently been a large decline in union membership in the private
sector.
The weakening of workers’ resistance continued after the 2008-9 recession. The (ostensibly) low
rate of profit of firms resulted in acceptance by workers and unions of the inevitability of
redundancies and wage cuts, with negligible resistance (something neglected in most left
commentary). Poor jobs in consumer services (fictitious ‘self employment’, low wages, no security,
zero hour contracts, no benefits or pensions) expanded massively. This eventually resulted in new
union organising, mainly in London; but overall the ‘gig economy’ conveyed the message: workers
must work harder for less pay because valorisation of capital requires it. After 2010, the cuts to
state spending, public sector wages and services (section 4) were sporadically resisted by the unions,
but separately by sector and with few successes. The government imposed the rule of value on
workers in and users of services via the ‘need’ to reduce the debt and annual deficit, and to reduce
taxes on capital. The debt was contested by the Occupy movement, and the low taxation of
corporations by the Uncut movement. But neither had concrete, winnable demands, and they do not
seem to have durably shifted public opinion.
Since 1985 the most militant collective struggles have been around environmental issues; the police
repression previously directed at union struggles has been used with increasing brutality against
environmental activists. While these initiatives have seldom achieved material changes, they have
had considerable success in increasing public awareness of ecological problems.
Neoliberalisation of social reproduction, also, has led to increasing conservatism (Gough and
Eisenschitz, 2006: Ch.6). Since the 1970s, cuts to services and their declining quality have
encouraged people to see others as competitors for these services rather than collective consumers
of them. The same is true for social housing as its supply has halved since the 1980s. Rapidly
increasing housing costs have compelled individuals and households to work increasing hours;
housing costs and the servicing of increased consumer debt make people reluctant to take industrial
action or to leave poor jobs. Many public spaces have been privatised, or degraded, undermining a

visible collective good. Changes in the housing market, and the need to move region for work, have
weakened neighbourly relations. People’s time and energy for social interactions and political
organisation have been eroded by the intensification of work and increasingly anti-social working
hours; by declining provision of public services which requires greater domestic work, mainly
falling on women; and by declining health services and unhealthy consumption and travel modes
eroding physical health. Neoliberalism exhausts and demoralises, a direct material root of
depoliticisation.
These economic and social changes have elicited greater ‘individualisation’, reliance on the
resources of oneself or one’s family, and its correlate, a will to compete with others for jobs,
housing and public services. Individualisation has been reinforced by intensified consumerism,
now strongly mediated by social media: people’s sense of self-worth and creativity are increasingly
(and precariously) sought through consumption, reflected in and reinforced by TV shows on
property, lifestyle and holidays. In the last twenty years the rise of social media has enabled some
new forms of connection and collectivity, but also severed and fragmented social life. Social media
are a key site for the competitive promotion of the self, and its correlate, the denigration of others
(Crary, 2013). The sense of collectivity given by friendship has been weakened by conversations
with friends being constantly interrupted by examination of the personal screen (Murphy, 2019).
The performance of competition in ‘reality shows’ on TV reflects and reinforces this
individualisation.
Individualisation has led to increasing loneliness, depression and lack of self-esteem, which make it
difficult to participate in collectivities. It inclines people to despise ‘the losers’ – the poor, the
disabled, the mentally ill (Jones, 2016), reinforcing the centuries-old division between the
‘respectable’ and the ‘rough’ working class; the campaign of the coalition government in cutting
benefits to these groups was extraordinarily successful because it resonated with changes in feeling
originating in social life. Whether face to face or via social media, inter-personal relations become
increasingly angry: frustrations get taken out on others in a way which does nothing to address the
problems and undermines any sense of collectivity. One form of this heightened competition is
with members of other ethnic or ‘racial’ groups.
In a dialectical reversal, people seek to counter the loneliness and precarity of individualisation by
developing real or imagined ties to neighbourhood, ethnic group, nation or ‘tradition’; this
‘collective narcissism’ in turn reinforces racism and xenophobia. These have been central to the
rise of the far right (section 7 below). In deindustrialised, poor regions, relations with neighbours
have increased importance for material and psychological support. One can suppose that this
produces pressure to conformity in political views; people in some Leave neighbourhoods reported
that ‘everyone around here thinks the same’ about immigration, Brexit and Corbyn (Chakrabortty,
2019a; Helm, 2019).
Neoliberalism has cumulatively changed popular views of the capacities of the state. State
intervention into industry and labour markets to create (better) jobs has been discredited.
Neoliberal fiscal policy involves tax cuts, especially for business, and cuts in spending, especially
on benefits and public services, and eschewing of state borrowing even for investment. Forty years
of this practice by governments have convinced most people that this fiscal policy is the only way
to revive private investment: ‘there is no alternative’ (Elliott, 2019).
All this has altered perceptions of parliamentary politics and politicians. The failure of
governments to resolve the stagnation of the economy since the 1970s, despite promises, has led to
the view that politicians are useless and mendacious. A lack of understanding of how the economy
works leads to political debate being conducted as slogans and sound bites, a form perfectly served
by social media. There are hardly any public (or, one suspects, private) discussions of the economy

or economic policy, that is, conversations which analyse and put concepts in question (Gunn, 1989).
The social media create constant distraction which militates against sustained analysis of anything.
This has its correlate in a search for quick fixes. The discrediting of government intervention into
the economy, combined with the chronic degradation of jobs and social life, has led to people
looking to ‘strong, decisive, charismatic’ individuals to ‘sort things out’ – mayors instead of local
councils, ‘czars’ instead of ministers, and party leaders rather than governments and parties.
Paradoxically, while all politicians are discredited, one politician comes to be regarded as the
saviour.
We see, then, that austerity does not necessarily result in opposition to capital or an austerity
government; the opposite may be the case. This helps to explain why in 1935, in the depths of the
depression, the Conservatives gained their largest ever majority. Neoliberalism in Britain over 45
years has cumulatively constructed individualism and competition within the working class; has
reified the rule of capital through value categories; and has wiped social democratic and Keynesian
regulation out of the popular imagination. The rise of the social media has tended to exacerbate
these problems. This is an essential backdrop for understanding British politics since 2005, in
particular the debate on austerity, the economic arguments around Brexit, and the appeal of
xenophobia.
These changes in popular consciousness have evolved slowly but cumulatively over forty years.
This consciousness is therefore likely to have developed differently in the lives of people of
different ages. People over 60 experienced the defeats of the unions in the 1980s and have lived for
decades under neoliberalism. Many have been materially, physically and psychologically ground
down by neoliberalism and thus have no wish to fight it. Younger people had had less time to
imbibe and develop neoliberal ideas, and to be ground down by neoliberal life, yet were confronted
with the deprivations and injustice of austerity. We can suppose that this difference in experience
contributed to the dramatic difference by age in the 2019 vote.

Disenchantment with the Labour Party
The record of New Labour in office 1997-2010 produced increasing disenchantment with the party.
Aside from some improvements to public services (Sure Start, nurseries) and introduction of a (low
and unpoliced) minimum wage, the government pursued a neoliberal path. It was hostile to the
trade unions and workers’ struggles, and left Thatcher’s anti-union laws intact. It did not reverse the
huge rise in inequality under the Conservatives. It practiced repressive policing of protests and
demonstrations. Its industrial strategy privileged the City of London and media and cultural
industries: its Regional Development Agencies were too weak to prevent the decline in
manufacturing. It used PFIs for new public sector investments, and failed to tackle tax evasion and
avoidance, worsening pressures on public spending. The government’s bail out of the banks after
the 2008 crash was not blamed on the financial system; Cameron was therefore able to blame the
government debt on ‘Labour’s extravagance’, with lasting effects on people’s view of Labour.
In opposition in 2010-5 Miliband argued for austerity-lite, supporting some cuts but not others; this
made it impossible for Labour to contribute to the movement against austerity. He instructed his
MPs to abstain on the Universal Credit bill so as not to be seen as siding with ‘benefit scroungers’.
When the demolition of local government, corruptly targeted on Labour authorities, began in 2010,
the party failed to organise any coordinated resistance; Labour councils therefore became purveyors
of the cuts. Thus the Labour leadership from 1997 to 2005 reinforced neoliberal ideas and failed to
develop social democratic and collectivist ones. In the Scottish independence referendum in 2014
Labour argued for unity of the UK in alliance with the Tories; this caused a sharp drop in support

for the party in the west of Scotland where the yes vote had been highest, and led to a wipe out of
Labour in the 2015 Westminster election.
The party itself was increasingly tightly controlled from the centre. Blairite London apparatchiks
were parachuted into Labour seats in the Midlands and the North, where they generally had little
interaction with the voters. Disenchantment with Labour was reflected in declining election votes
from 1997 to 2015 (Chakrabortty, 2019b). This was the difficult starting point for Corbyn’s renewal
of the party.

The offensive of the far right from 2015 to 2020
The offensive of the far right from 2015 to 2020, via the 2016 referendum, its takeover of the Tory
party, and its victory in the 2019 general election, is a new stage in the neoliberal ‘class war from
above’. As we have seen, the Cameron government in 2010-5 ratcheted up austerity, and failed to
protect the environment or confront the climate emergency; it set an arbitrary target for net
immigration, and migrants and refugees, including unaccompanied children, were blocked from
entering the country; black immigrants from the 1950s and 1960s were deported; the Home Office
became openly racist. But the Tory Right wished to go further on all these fronts. Its project has
had two linked aspects (for a fuller treatment see Gough, 2019a).
(i) Brexit for capital
The Tory Right has opposed Britain’s EC/EU membership since the 1970s, disliking its social
democratic aspects. The base of the Tory Right has been in finance, property and imperial
corporations operating overseas, rather than in manufacturing, reflecting a long-standing split
within British capital (Anderson, 1967; Fine and Harris,1985).
For the far right, Brexit aims to abolish legal and political constraints protecting ecosystems,
workers in the workplace, and the quality of consumer commodities. It avoids the ongoing moves
by the EU towards increased coordination of corporate taxation, clamp down on tax havens
(including Britain and its overseas dependencies), and increased regulation of banking. It ends
Britain’s net contribution to the EU budget. Note that ending immigration from the EU is not an
aim of the far right.
Brexit is, however, contradictory for capital. Exit from the Customs Union will severely undermine
manufacturing and farming within Britain, and possibly some sectors of finance. The representative
bodies of capital have protested, but these protests have so far been ignored. My interpretation is
that, first, much British-owned or headquartered capital does not produce within Britain but
operates abroad outside the EU, and is therefore indifferent to EU membership: speculative finance,
fossil fuels and mining, large scale construction, imperial agricultural corporations. Second,
manufacturing within Britain is carried out overwhelmingly by transnational corporations, which
already have other manufacturing sites within the EU, and the same is true for the retail banks.
Transfer of production from Britain to the EU is therefore not too difficult. Opposition from capital
to the Brexiteers has therefore been muted.
(ii) Winning working class support for Brexit, and hence for neoliberalism
The Brexiteers could not win popular support by presenting their real aims. They have therefore
used xenophobia and nationalism. In this they learnt from Thatcher’s use of the war in the
Falklands to regain public support after its precipitous drop in the recession of 1979-82, enabling
her easily to win the 1983 election. The Leave campaign made two promises: end immigration

from the EU (and implicitly from elsewhere); and end meddling by ‘the Brussels bureaucrats’ in
British affairs – ‘take back control’. From the Leave campaign through to the 2019 election,
negotiations with Brussels were presented as a war against an enemy; MPs who tried to soften the
withdrawal agreement were ‘traitors’. The tendency of neoliberal life to elicit nationalism was
exploited. During the election campaign, the Brexit party produced an advertisement: a picture of
Merkel, arm raised; ‘We didn’t win two world wars to be dictated to by a Kraut’.
These messages were stunningly successful. They powered the Leave vote in 2016, and the Tories’
election campaign in 2019 centred on ‘get Brexit done’. But, as section 5 suggests, these ideas are
not a product of rightwing propaganda alone: they arise spontaneously through workers’ daily life,
particularly in a period of stagnation and neoliberalism. This argument is developed in the next
section.

Why people voted Leave in 2016
The form of the referendum campaign was woefully inadequate for rational debate. The economic
relationship of Britain to the EU and the institutions and policies of the EU are enormously complex,
and the vast majority of people had no prior knowledge and understanding of them. Most Leavers
and Remainers therefore voted on the basis of a single aspect which they (thought they) understood.
The Irish referenda on abortion and equal marriage used citizens’ fora to discuss the issues in depth.
This would have been an improvement, though the fora would have had to run for a year or more
adequately to tackle the issues.
A second major problem was that there were only two options in the ballot. Very few voters were
aware that there were many different possibilities for Britain’s relationship with the EU after Brexit.
In the referendum, there were three main reasons for voting Leave, each with important
differentiations (see further Gough, 2017). These derive from the ideologies fostered by
neoliberalism (section 5).
(i) Xenophobia
This took two forms:(a) Material: ‘Immigrants’ are seen as competitors for jobs, services and housing. Neoliberalism,
and the apparent impossibility of social democracy, mean that jobs, housing and public services are
seen as fixed by ‘markets’; workers then have to compete with each other for them. For people who
had lived in Britain for some time, an ‘obvious’ form of this competition is to attempt to exclude
immigrants. (A third of BME people voted to leave, presumably for this reason.) In some localities,
this inter-ethnic competition is ‘visible’ in employment, housing and use of public services.
(b) Symbolic: Neoliberal deprivations and atomisation can make people yearn for stronger
neighbourhood ties. For many older, British-born people, this puts a high value on white
community (‘collective narcissism’). This can be a nostalgic, rose-tinted memory. Immigrant
cultures symbolically threaten this.
I hypothesise that these feelings were strongly differentiated by age group and type of locality:
Large cities. In these, the competition for jobs, housing and public services between British-born
people and ‘immigrants’ is not visible because the numbers of jobs, housing units and public service

units are very large and spread across the city, and geographical linkages between residence and
work are very complex. The large cities largely voted Remain.
Large and medium towns and rural districts with large BME populations, for example South
Lancashire, West Yorkshire, Leicester, Luton, Dagenham. These localities have had large BME
populations since the 1960s. Employment, residential areas and social life are now strongly divided
by ethnicity. White working class people may resent BME people for both material and symbolic
reasons. Agricultural areas in East Anglia with large Eastern European populations are similar. All
these localities voted for Leave.
De-industrialised small towns, former coal fields, and rural areas in the Midlands, North and Wales.
These are have a very small number of BME people and Eastern Europeans; the populations are
overwhelmingly British-born and white. These localities are poor because the working class jobs
have disappeared and young working class people have moved to cities; large proportions of the
population are over 50 or retired. In these areas, anti-immigrant feeling is for symbolic reasons.
These localities, too, voted for Leave.
These differences in xenophobia by locality correlate strongly with Labour’s vote in the 2019
election: Labour largely maintained its vote in the large cities, but lost seats elsewhere.
(ii) Anti-state ideology
Neoliberalism has developed the popular view that the state, at whatever spatial scale, is ineffective
in meeting people’s material needs, and is in certain ways tyrannical, particularly in its taxation and
‘bureaucracy’. Given the opportunity to decide whether to have a certain level of the state - here,
the EU - people may then vote not to have it. For older people, this may be reinforced by British
nationalism versus an EU ‘controlled by Germans’.
(iii) Lack of understanding of the economic consequences of Brexit
To counter these views the Remain campaign, including the Labour Party, and backed by business
organisations, argued, correctly, that leaving the EU would have dire consequences for investment
and jobs within Britain. The Leave campaign claimed, falsely, that trade with the EU could quickly
be replaced by new trade agreements with non-EU states. But the Remainers’ dire predictions were
not believed because they were not understood. To understand this crucial point requires analysis at
three levels of abstraction (for a fuller treatment see Gough, 2019b).
First, for historical materialism, knowledge and understanding of social processes are always
determined by people’s social practice; the impact of discourses and the absorption and
development of ideas depend on the materially-based social relations in which people regularly
participate. In capitalism, economic knowledge of working class people (the 90%) is focussed on
the markets in which they participate day-to-day – jobs in their industry and workplace, markets in
the housing tenures relevant to them, and markets in consumer commodities. This gives knowledge
of concrete markets in a particular place and time, and understanding of some underlying processes
such as price determination by supply and demand. But workers have no involvement in decisions
on capital investment and production organisation, since these are the prerogative of capital. They
therefore no practical knowledge of these decisions, nor understanding of the processes which drive
investment and production.
Second, in consequence, most people do not understand the economic geography of modern
capitalism, in particular that of the EU. Fundamental are economies of scale enabled by
concentration of production in space; specialisation of production by workplace, firm and territory;

the consequent international division of labour; thus international trade in inputs and final products
in manufacturing and some services. These processes are powered by competition which is partly
on the basis of cost but also on the design and quality of the product or service, that is, both price
and quality competition. Since the 1950s, the EC/EU has sought to develop these processes in
order to enhance productive accumulation of capital. Ignorance of these processes means that the
embedding of the British economy in the EU through the division of labour/trade and flows of
labour power cannot be understood.
Third, it is a commonplace that the great majority of people are ignorant of the economic
institutions and policy mechanisms of the EU: the Customs Union, the Single Market, agricultural,
industrial and regional policies, industrial-technical collaborations, and regulation of monopoly and
state aid to industry. This ignorance is often attributed to the complexity of these arrangements, to
the ‘remoteness’ of Brussels, or to the chronic lack of coverage of the EU in the British media. But,
more profoundly, the purpose of EU institutions cannot be understood without an understanding of
the economic geography which they exist to regulate. For example, the Customs Union regulates
the quality and specification of commodities because of the importance of these in high profit
production (technical/design rents); and it upholds minimum standards in labour markets and
ecology to promote quality competition rather than cost-cutting. Ignorance of economic dynamics
therefore means that the importance of staying in the Customs Union for jobs could not be
understood. This ignorance was exacerbated by the fading understanding under neoliberalism of
postwar social-democratic economic regulation (section 5).
The result was that in 2016 and 2019 most Leavers, and even many Remainers, had no appreciation
of the long-term damage that exit from the EU would inflict on investment and employment within
Britain; the Leave appeal to xenophobia and sovereignty therefore had no counterbalance. As we
shall see, this was crucial to result of the 2019 election.
I now consider how the Labour Party campaigned on its policies from after the referendum through
to the 2019 election campaign. The party faced acute difficulties because of the ideological
inheritance of neoliberalism, popular lack of understanding of the (macro) economy, the referendum
result, and the domination of parliamentary politics for over three years by Brexit. These were
compounded by the issue of Corbyn’s leadership.
Presentation of Labour’s economic, social and ecological programme
Labour’s programme offered some substantial benefits to firms producing in Britain: the National
and Regional Development Banks; increased building work; regulations benefiting small business;
improved worker training. But business disliked Labour’s proposed increases in corporate taxation,
democratisation of corporate governance, state ownership of utilities and phasing out of PFIs, and
so offered little support.
To the 90%, the programme offered very substantial material benefits and empowerment in
employment, the home and service use, and potential for active involvement in economic and social
life. But we have seen that 45 years of neoliberalism have discredited social democratic policies,
posing an enormous task for Labour. The difficulty of this task, however, varied considerably by
policy area: some policies are easier to understand than others; some conflict with neoliberal ideas
more than others; some require understanding and knowledge of the meso- or macro-economy (cf
section 8), some not; in some the benefits are immediate, in others indirect or long-term. (For
greater detail, see Gough, 2020.) Notable are:-

* labour market policies: easy to understand, and popular since widespread poor wages and
conditions are well known.
* policies to increase productive investment: requires knowledge of patterns of investment and
productivity, which very few have.
* nationalisation of utilities: a popular policy, since everyone has experience of poor and overpriced services. But use of profits and investment under private and public ownership are not well
understood. Subject to the objection from older people that nationalised services in the past had
their failings.
* new distinction between revenue and investment spending, funded respectively by taxation and
borrowing: a crucial part of the programme, but hardly anyone understands it.
* increased taxation of corporations and the rich: media coverage has always presented all taxes as
the same (bad), with no distinction between taxation of business and people. Many therefore
assumed that Labour’s tax rises would fall on them. This was the biggest single problem in
communicating Labour’s programme.
* increased taxes on business and the rich: existing taxes on business and the rich are little known;
the diversity of mechanisms for increasing these taxes in Labour programme was confusing,
compared with, for example, increasing income tax or VAT rate. Some taxes are open to the
neoliberal objection that they would harm investment.
* spending on public services: the benefits are easy to grasp. But spending on benefits is subject to
the ‘deserving/ undeserving’ objection (section 5). Spending on free services is open to the
objection that beneficiaries do not need it (e.g. free university student tuition), and to envy.
* increased borrowing for investment: at very low interest rates, this was a fairly easy sell, though
subject to fetishisation of the government debt.
* council house building and regulation of private renting: the outcomes were popular. But open to
the objection that supply of private rentals might decline, as happened in the 1960s. Council renting
rather than owner occupation conflicts with a deeply established cultural preference.
I hypothesise that the appeal of the economic and ecological programme was strongly differentiated
by age. I suggested in section 5 that older people have developed more strongly neoliberal ideas
than younger people. Younger adults would benefit strongly from the reformed labour market,
housing policies, and university fee abolition. In contrast, people over 50 in employment may not
expect that their job will improve before retirement. Most older people have lived in their home for
a long period, the majority in either owner-occupied housing on which the mortgage has been paid
off or in council housing, so Labour’s housing programme offered little except home insulation.
Moreover, older people are more likely to have the Methodist culture of living modestly, resenting
hand-outs to the undeserving, and seeing government borrowing as contradicting their belief in
saving. For them, the main benefit offered by Labour’s programme was in improvements to the
NHS and social care. These differences by age may account for the differences in voting in the
2017 election, where Labour’s surge in popularity was centred on younger voters, and for the
enormous difference in the 2019 election.
Overall, then, despite the popularity of some policies, the lack of understanding and neoliberal
objections meant that Labour needed a systematic campaign to explain the policies. But from 2015,
there was no such campaign, with the exception of the two election periods. Economic policy was

developed by John McDonnell with the advice of policy forums on particular aspects, and one-off
regional meetings of party members. Policies appeared from time to time on the party’s website;
but there was no attempt systematically to educate party members, for example by provision of
simple explanations of each aspect of policy, and it is likely that most members had little
understanding of the ‘difficult’ issues mentioned above. This made it impossible for local parties to
educate the public on the economic programme. This crucial failure was doubtless partly due to the
many pressures of time on the party leadership after the referendum; but it was perhaps also due to
an optimistic view that the obvious benefits of the programme would speak for themselves, and an
underestimation of the neoliberalisation of popular consciousness.
This problem was compounded by the poor election campaign in 2019. The central slogan of the
manifesto, ‘It’s time for real change’, was vacuous. There was no campaign material (leaflets, cards)
with the key points. There was no dossier on the Conservatives’ and Johnson’s record, Labour’s
strongest card, and the leadership refrained from attacking this record. Corbyn put strong emphasis
on attacking the government’s negotiations of a trade deal with the US, but this relied on leaks of
meetings, and the eventual deal was hypothetical. Most damagingly, very little was said about the
proposed rise in taxation of capital and the rich to finance increased public spending, which I have
suggested was poorly understood by the public. There was no explanation of the overall spending
plan, but a spaced succession of spending promises, which therefore appeared profligate. This was
excerbated by new promises made during the campaign. The carefully planned balance of tax and
spend in the manifesto was upended by an abrupt promise of an extra £56bn to compensate for the
deficit of state pensions of a cohort of women. The financial planning of utility nationalisations
was confused by a promise of free universal high-speed broadband. This produced scepticism about
the feasibility of Labour’s programme. A symptom: opinion polls showed that the Tories were
‘more trusted’ than Labour with the NHS; this can only have been due to voters believing that
Labour’s programme was not feasible.
Support for Labour’s Green New Deal involved rather different determinants. In the previous two
years or so, multiple ecological disasters worldwide, the school strikes and Extinction Rebellion
have effected a large shift in public opinion in Britain on the climate emergency. The Tories had an
atrocious ecological record, and Johnson refused to debate the issue. The Green New Deal
promised a million high quality jobs, and insulation of millions of homes. The impact of this may
have been weakened by scepticism about the programme’s funding by borrowing; and the economic
logic, in which costs fall initially on the state but much larger financial benefits accrue to
individuals, is poorly understood.
Labour’s stance on Brexit
In the ‘debate’ before the referendum, Labour argued for Remain on the basis that leaving the EU
would severely damage trade and thus jobs. Corbyn attempted to deal with the xenophobia by
arguing that the problem of immigration was due to poor wages and conditions, weak unions, and a
lack of effective policing of employment law, all of which a Labour government would ameliorate.
The result of the referendum posed an unavoidable dilemma for Labour. The six most strongly
Remain seats had Labour MPs, as did the six most strongly Leave seats. The majority for Leave
was narrow, and the Leave campaign was known to have cheated in various ways. Labour could
have continued to argue for Remain. But it decided to accept Brexit while pushing to remain in the
Customs Union and with a ‘close relationship’ to the Single Market (free movement of people and
capital), which would also avoid a new divide on the border in Ireland. This acceptance of Brexit
was motivated by a desire to avoid arguing with Leave voters about the legitimacy of the

referendum.2 Over three years, Labour in parliament, alongside other parties, attempted to get May
to incorporate at least part of its policy into the withdrawal agreement, unsuccessfully.
With either a Remain or a soft Brexit strategy, Labour had an enormous task of explaining the logic
of its policy: to save production in Britain from collapse. As we saw in section 8, the great majority
of the population had no understanding of the economic geography of the EU, the embeddedness of
the British economy within it, and the rationale for (at least) remaining in the Customs Union. To
begin to explain this, the Labour Party would have needed to undertake first a systematic education
of its members, and then systematic education of the public. This was not done. This failure was
perhaps because the leadership thought that the government would agree a withdrawal agreement
with the EU within a short time, or would adopt a soft Brexit approach to appease the 48% who
voted Remain and to safeguard jobs within Britain. Neither of these things happened, for reasons I
discussed in section 7. In campaigning for a soft Brexit, Labour could also have used more
imaginative tactics, for example organising events outside the many vehicle factories where
production was being run down because of an anticipated hard Brexit. The Tories are more canny:
during the election campaign Johnson visited a factory every day and had his picture taken with ‘I
love Boris’ workers. Labour’s push for a soft Brexit therefore took place solely in the unfavourable
terrain of parliament, without the support of Leavers.
In September 2019 Labour conference voted for a new stance on Brexit, a compromise agreed
between Remainers and Leavers: elect a Labour government, negotiate a better withdrawal
agreement (i.e. the existing policy on the Customs Union and Single Market), then hold a
referendum to decide between this Brexit and Remain, allowing Labour MPs to campaign for either,
with Corbyn not declaring his opinion. We do not know how many Remainers voted for Labour as
a result of this change (I suspect not a large number). But we do know that for many people in
Leave seats this was the major reason for not voting Labour. The proposed second referendum was
seen as Labour abandoning its commitment to Brexit. Over three years people’s reasons for voting
for Brexit had remained largely unchallenged. Moreover, the vote for Brexit became a thing in
itself, independent of its original motivations or content: this was the only time that voters had been
consulted on such a major issue, so disregarding their view was insulting. Moreover, Brexit
embodied British national pride, so reversing it was unpatriotic. The depth of this feeling was
evidently not appreciated by Remainer MPs and party members in London and the south. Trickett
and Lavery, two Northern MPs, warned on this, but their 36 page document was ignored by the
London leadership (Stewart, 2019).

The Corbyn factor
Neoliberalism has produced an increased emphasis on party leaders (section 5); elections have
become quasi-presidential. We saw in section 2 that strongly negative views of Corbyn were
important in the election. From Johnson’s election as party leader, the negative views of Corbyn
were relative to Johnson’s popularity.
(i) Labour’s changing position on the EU from Remain to soft Brexit in 2016, and to a second
referendum in 2019, made Corbyn appear indecisive. In contrast, from 2015 Johnson stuck to his
hard Brexit position. Corbyn’s handling of anti-semitic statements by Labour members was seen as
weak leadership, even by people who did not believe him to be anti-semitic. The continuous
undermining of Corbyn by Blairite and centrist MPs made him appear weak – ‘he can’t even control
his own party’, whereas Johnson has been ruthless with MPs who differed from him.
(ii) The Tories’ and the far right’s social media attack on Corbyn certainly told lies about his lack of
patriotism, for example that he was a member of Hamas. But it is true that he has a long history of

opposing British imperialism (Ireland, the Middle East); the manifesto has some anti-imperialist
policies; and he has sometimes been critical of actions by British soldiers – a major issue in the
North which supplies a disproportionate number of recruits to the army. Opposition to British
imperialism has been weak in the working class over centuries, and neoliberalism has led to
increasing pride in ‘Britishness’. In his time as leader, it was impossible for Corbyn to win voters
to anti-imperialism, particularly given the domination of political discourse by Brexit and austerity.
It was therefore easy to portray Corbyn as unpatriotic, a hater of Britain, and a supporter of
terrorism.
(iii) Corbyn’s debating skills are undoubtedly weak. The campaigning that Corbyn had done all his
life was rousing speeches to the converted, very different from debate with the right. Corbyn’s
decision to ‘go high, not low’ in debate with the Tories added to the impression of weakness. (The
phrase was taken from Clinton in her contest with Trump: a bad omen.) He refrained from
criticising Johnson’s record, integrity and grasp of policy. In contrast, Johnson has always
slandered his opponents, which (as with Trump) is read by many voters as a sign of ‘a strong
leader’.
(iv) Johnson’s constructed persona as sexually promiscuous, careless about his children, thus macho;
as a plain speaking, bar room, politically-incorrect loud mouth; as ‘our mate Boris’; as a shameless
liar; and as author of daft, expensive projects, rather than counting against him, were seen by many
voters as a sign of his strength as a leader (compare Trump).
Of these aspects, Labour could only feasibly have changed (i) (by not changing Brexit positions)
and (iii). The rest was fate.
A major tactical error – but with deep roots
Labour gave its support to Johnson in October 2019 to call a general election, without which he
could not have done so. This was foolish. The withdrawal bill had not yet gone through parliament,
so Johnson could run the election on ‘get Brexit done’. Labour was around 15% behind the
Conservatives in the opinion polls, and Corbyn had a popularity rating of –50%. The leadership
evidently thought that Labour could repeat its surge in 2017. But that was against May, who had
called an election which had no point, and who had none of Johnson’s charisma. A deeper problem
was that the leadership did not understand the depth of feeling over Brexit among many working
class voters outside London (section 10), nor the lack of understanding of the party’s economic
programme (section 9). This misreading my have partly arisen from the three main leaders of the
party being London MPs, but more importantly from the party membership being sparse in the
Midlands and North outside of the large cities.

Conclusion: why Labour lost
My analysis has attempted to trace some of the dialectics of large scale and long term structures
with the consciousness and activity of agents – citizens, corporations, and the two parties.
In capitalist democracies, parliamentary politics are inherently fetishistic and remote for the
majority of the population. Governments have very limited effects on capitalist accumulation; the
population does not participate in decisions on investment and production organisation and
therefore has little understanding of them; a choice on government strategy is given only every five
years.

The history of British capitalism and imperialism has produced capital which is unusually strongly
focused on spatial mobility and sectoral flexibility, discipline and passivity of labour, and freedom
from state regulation. Working class culture has a strong element of submission to the logics of
value, and nationalism and xenophobia.
Under neoliberalism, changes in the economy, employment relations and social life have fostered
individualism and weakened practices and ideas of collectivity. The discipline of value has been
reinforced, and support for, and understanding of, the socialisation of production and reproduction
reduced. Failures of the state have made ‘a strong leader’ appealing. The social media have, on the
whole, reinforced these developments. Neoliberal austerity, and the absence of a feasible social
democratic alternative, have fostered xenophobia and racism among the white working class,
viewed as a means of competition for jobs, housing and public services, or as a means of reestablishing white working class community and solidarity at the local or national level.
Labour’s period in government 1997-2010 and in opposition 2010-5 reinforced neoliberal ideology,
and also led to steady loss of working class support and membership.
In the early 2000s the Tory Right and the Brexit Party launched an offensive to leave the EU and
thus deepen neoliberalism and give greater freedom to (some) sections of capital. The ambivalence
of many sectors of capital allowed the Right to take over the Tory party. The Brexiteers sought to
win support for Brexit from the population by using xenophobia and British/English nationalism,
despite these being antithetical to the Brexiters’ economic aims. This support drew on people’s own
experience and interpretation of life under neoliberalism, particularly their understanding of
immigration, of the state, and of Britain as a nation and culture. The understanding of immigration
was sharply differentiated between cities, racially-mixed towns, and old industrial areas.
Labour’s response over 2015-19 made a number of errors. It did not seek systematically to educate
the public on the economic implications of Brexit and different possible future relations with the
EU. Labour’s change of stance after the referendum was probably necessary, but the change of
policy in September 2019 gravely weakened its message.
Labour’s economic programme was not systematically campaigned for over 2015-9. During the
election campaign the party did not make a priority of explaining its tax and borrowing proposals,
and so succumbed to the objection ‘where’s the money coming from?’. It was thus unable to
overcome the widespread acceptance of austerity as inevitable. It exacerbated this problem by
making additional promises during the election campaign, reinforcing the impression that Labour
was extravagant. On the economy and immigration, Labour had great success with younger people,
but failure with older; and more success in cities than elsewhere.
Change in political culture under neoliberalism made a ‘strong’ party leader important. On this,
Johnson scored heavily over Corbyn. Corbyn could have improved his image in certain ways, but
the trope of his being ‘unpatriotic’ was impossible to combat.
The record of the government since 2010, and of Johnson, were Labour’s strongest suit. But
Labour’s criticism of them, throughout 2015-9 and during the election campaign, was weak. A
strong attack would also have helped to ameliorate the public’s perception of Corbyn as a leader.
Labour made an error in September 2019 in agreeing to a general election when it had not
effectively campaigned for its policies on Brexit and the economy, and when it was far behind in the
opinion polls. This was partly caused by a misreading of the party’s surge in popularity during the
2017 election campaign. But it also reflected a failure of the London-based leadership to hear and
take seriously working class opinion outside London.

What are the lessons for social democratic parties seeking election to government in the present
period? I have argued that decades of neoliberalism have produced for these parties a double
problem of popular consciousness. First, people’s experience of economic and social life has
fostered an acceptance of neoliberal precepts, and erased understanding of social democratic
alternatives. This is not merely a cognitive shift but a cultural one, individualisation: a reliance of
one’s own resources, self-promotion, and competition with and antagonism towards others.
Underlying this is the ignorance of production organisation and investment dynamics arising from
workers’ exclusion from control over them. Second, these experiences, and the absence of a
credible left alternative, have fostered a view that the most viable strategy for addressing economic,
social and cultural problems is to reduce immigration, a view systematically reinforced by the far
right. Social democratic parties can address this dual problem only by systematic, long term
education of the public on capitalist economics and its failures, and propaganda which demonstrates
the failures of neoliberalism and the promise and feasibility of a social democratic programme. A
precondition for undertaking this task is a recognition of the scale of the problem, that is, the depth
of rightwing consciousness in the population. The left also needs to acknowledge that people’s
response to political-economic programmes is not based on a simple ‘rational’ calculus of their
immediate benefits.
This of course is a very difficult task. The culture of working class self-education of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century has long since withered. The media and the social media are
dominated by the right. But some elements can be suggested. The main medium should be the
internet. The party needs to educate its members in economics and its economic policy. It needs to
have clear texts on its website, with a whole range from terse slogans and ‘ten basic points’ to long
analyses and explanations. These need to imaginatively dramatised in video. It should have open
(though curated), permanent discussion fora on all aspects of policy. These party sites should be
linked with the numerous left podcasts and videos, including the satirical and comic. Analyses and
propaganda produced by ‘sectoral’ organisations and campaigns - trade union, ecological, housing,
public service struggles, local economic initiatives – need to be re-broadcast and learnt from. In
short, we need to start creating a networked ecology of left education and propaganda, which
enables exchange between the party and local and sectoral ideas. This network would stand a better
chance of influencing the public than the production of a text manifesto four weeks before an
election.
Notes
1. The 2019 manifesto also contained significant policies on foreign relations and the arms industry,
Britain’s most successful high-tech and export manufacturing sector. Leftward movement on these
issues was limited by pressure from Unite which wished to maintain the skilled and well-paid jobs
in the sector; this is a major difficulty for social democracy in Britain, France and the US. I do not
consider international relations further in this article, except in relation to perceptions of Corbyn,
since they have not formed a significant part of political debate since 2015.
2. The far left in Britain has long criticised the EU’s neoliberal restrictions on state aid to industries
and firms. Corbyn shared these criticisms, and this may have inclined him to soft Brexit rather than
Remain. Some left commentators have argued, however, that a Labour government could have
finessed these rules, as other states have repeatedly done.
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